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Abstract
On being released  from her black-and-white room into a colorful world it would seem Mary learns 
something new (the Knowledge Argument). On being released from his B-theory room into an A-
theory world it would seem Mark learns something new (the Temporal Knowledge Argument). These 
thought experiments are parallel to each other and can inform each other.
1.   
For the purposes of this paper, I'll will use the A-theory of time, presentism (or at least the growing 
block universe), and the moving spotlight theory interchangeably. And I'll use the B-theory of time, the 
block universe, and eternalism interchangeably. 
The A-theory holds that
(a) there is an ontologically distinguished Present (or at least a growing block), 
(b) there is a real, irreducible process of temporal becoming
The B-theory/Eternalism holds that
(a) there is no objective flow of time
(b) time is a dimension ontologically like the dimensions of space
(c) present, past, and future are only indexical; there are no objective tensed facts
Consider the (ontological) Knowledge Argument, which was originally stated:
"Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black 
and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of 
vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on 
when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for 
example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this 
produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from 
the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is blue’.… What will happen when Mary 
is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will 
she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our 
visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she 
had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false." 
(Jackson 1982)
Compare that with the parallel time argument:
Mark is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a block 
universe via a block-universe's clock. He specializes in the neurophysiology of the perception of time 
and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical (block/eternalist) information there is to obtain about what 
goes on when we experience a present, or perceive a temporal becoming, and use terms like ‘past’, 
‘future’, and so on. He discovers, for example, just how long Caesium hyperfine transitions are (the 
basis of atomic clocks), and exactly how this correlates with cyclic brain processes which produce via 
the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that 
results in the uttering of the sentence ‘I am in the present and time is flowing’.… What will happen 
when Mark is released from his block universe (at, say, t = 10 min.) into a presentist, A-theoretic (or 
even growing block) universe or is given a moving spotlight television monitor? Will he learn anything 
or not? It seems just obvious that he will learn something about the world and our temporal experience 
of it (e.g. what an actual present and temporal becoming are like). But then is it inescapable that his 
previous knowledge was incomplete. But he had all the physical (block/eternalist) 
information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Eternalism (and the B-theory) is false.
Major responses to the Knowledge Argument include
1. Mary could sufficiently imagine blue before leaving the room (Dennett 2007; Churchland 1989; 
Maloney 1985) 
2. Mary acquired a new mode of presentation on leaving the room (Lockwood 1989; McConnell 1994; 
White 2007) 
3. Mary learned something new on leaving the room (Raymont 1999; Chalmers 2002; Nida-Rümelin 
2007)
Parallel responses to the Temporal Knowledge Argument would seem to include
1. Mark could sufficiently experience the A-series before leaving the block universe (A-theorists 
include Craig 2000; Crisp 2004; Forrest 2005) 
2. Mark acquired a new mode of presentation on leaving the block universe (Meyer 2011; Muller 2011; 
Dieks 20071)
3. Mark learned something new on leaving the block universe (Le Poidevin 1991; Oaklander 1991; 
Saunders 2002)
Concepts used to understand Mary can be applied to Mark, and vice versa. 
References
Chalmers, D., 2002, “Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”, in Q. Smith & A. Jokic 
(eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford, OUP 
Churchland, P., 1989, “Knowing Qualia. A Reply to Jackson”, in A Neurocomputational 
Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT, pp. 67–76. 
Craig, W. L. 2000, The Tensed Theory of Time, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Crisp, T. 2004, ‘On Presentism and Triviality’, in: D. Zimmerman, ed., Oxford Studies in  
Metaphysics: Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15–20.
Dennett, D., 2007, “What RoboMary Knows,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 15–31. 
Dieks, D., 2007, “Probability in modal interpretations of quantum mechanics,” Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 19, 292-310. 
Forrest, P. 2005, ‘General Facts, Physical Necessity and the Metaphysics of Time’, in: D.
Zimmerman, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Vol. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, F., 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–136. 
Le Poidevin, R. 1991, Change, Cause, and Contradiction, London: Macmillan.
Lockwood, M., 1989, Mind, brain, and the quantum. Oxford: Blackwell.
Maloney, Ch., 1985, “About Being a Bat”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1): 26–49. 
McConnell, 1994, “In Defense of the Knowledge Argument,” Philosophical Topics 22 (1&2): 
157–187. 
Meyer, U., 2011 "Time and Modality," in C. Callender, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the 
Philosophy of Time.  Oxford University Press, 2011.
1 Modal interpretations of quantum mechanics are prominent, and time in quantum mechanics is both a parameter and an 
operator, justifying it's inclusion here.
Muller, Thomas (2011) Branching space-times, general relativity, the Hausdorff property, and 
modal consistency. [Preprint at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8577/ ]  
Nida-Rümelin, M., 2007, “Grasping phenomenal properties,” in T. Alter & S. Walter  (eds.), 
2007, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. New Essays on Consciousness and  
Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 307–349. 
Oaklander, N. 1991, ‘A Defense of the New Tenseless Theory of Time’, Philosophical  
Quarterly, 41, pp. 26–38.
Raymont, P., 1999, “The Know-How Response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument”, Journal of  
Philosophical Research 24: 113–126. 
Saunders, S. 2002, ‘How Relativity Contradicts Presentism’, in Callender (ed.), Time, Reality,  
and Experience, University of California, San Diego  pp. 277–292.
White, St. L. 2007, “Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise,” in T. 
Alter & S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. New Essays on 
Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 210–248.
